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Abstract 
 
In most studies in the literature only the participation in a single programme versus non-participation is 
evaluated. This approach, however, does not address the needs of a comprehensive evaluation of an active 
public intervention in the labour market. Active labour market programmes, like the Portuguese, are not 
restricted to a particular measure. Rather, in most cases, the public employment service offers a wide variety 
of programmes to the universe of potential participants. In this context, the issue is participation in one 
programme versus participation in an alternative programme. In particular, it is appropriate to investigate 
which programme presents a higher causal effect. Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) extended the 
traditional matching methodology to a context of multiple programme participation. The approach followed in 
this paper intends to go even further. Indeed, since the traditional matching methodology, which considers 
the conditional independence assumption, is not appropriate in the context of the Portuguese labour market 
analysis, we will adopt the assumption of the bias stability. Taking into consideration the selection on 
unobservables, the matching methodology, combined with the difference-in-differences methodology, will be 
then our selected evaluation approach. The paper presents the estimation of the average treatment effects 
on the treated in six distinct states (the non-participation state, plus five “active” programmes). The results, in 
terms of employability, are not identical across the different states in the short-run (i.e. in the first six to 
twelve months after participation), but they do seem to converge in the long-run (i.e. after two and a half 
years). 
 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author: alcina@ipb.pt. The present work is part of a PhD research financed by 
the Community Program PRODEP III (Medida 5/Acção 5.3). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The focus of the evaluation literature of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs), which 
is vast and increasingly sophisticated, is typically the evaluation of a single programme. However, 
the work of Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001), who extended the matching methodology for a 
single treatment – under the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) – to the case of 
multiple treatments, stimulated advances in the econometric literature. The evaluation literature 
of labour market programmes is being extended to the evaluation of multiple programmes. That 
is, to programmes that are running simultaneous is a particular labour market.  
 The Portuguese labour market is an example of an institutional framework in which 
several ongoing active labour market programmes are available for the unemployed who are 
registered in the public employment service. An evaluation exercise that does not take into 
account the possibility of multiple treatments may not be sufficient to fully assess the impact of 
active labour market programmes. A comprehensive microeconometric evaluation of the 
Portuguese ALMPs seems therefore worthwhile. On top of that we do not know any work which 
addresses a comprehensive evaluation of active labour market policy in a multiple treatment 
context and even in the international literature empirical studies are not very common. 
Our study follows recent empirical applications of the matching estimator to a multiple 
treatment context originally proposed by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001). A particularly 
interesting piece is the work done by Gerfin and Lechner (2002). The authors have evaluated the 
impact of active labour market policy in Switzerland, using an administrative dataset similar to 
ours. Other contributions can also be referred to. Brodaty et al. (2001) evaluated, for the period 
1986-1988 and using administrative data, the effects of youth employment programmes that were 
set up in France to improve the labour market prospects of disadvantaged, unskilled young 
workers. Larsson (2003) evaluated, jointly, the effects on the employment of two Swedish active 
GEE 
THE PORTUGUESE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY DURING THE PERIOD 1998-2003 - A comprehensive conditional 
difference-in-differences application, Alcina Nunes and Paulino Teixeira 
 2
programmes. Finally, Dorsett (2001) evaluated the relative effectiveness of the New Deal’s option 
in reducing the male youth unemployment in the United Kingdom.  
These four references have one thing in common: they all use administrative data as we 
do. Our study uses the administrative records of Instituto de Emprego e Formação Profissional (IEFP) 
to assess the effectiveness of the Portuguese Active Labour market Policy to the improvement of 
the employability of participants. The raw dataset contains the individual records collected by all 
local offices of IEFP. It includes a substantial number of individual labour market characteristics 
and, in particular, very detailed information on participation in ALMPs over a period of six years 
(1998-2003). 
Our empirical implementation also implements the propensity score matching 
methodology but, in contrast, we do not rely on the Conditional Independence Assumption. 
Since we admit the existence of some selection on unobservables, our maintained hypothesis is 
the Bias Stability Assumption. This means therefore that we have extended the econometric 
multiple treatment evaluation framework to apply a nonparametric conditional difference-in-
differences methodology. This approach combines propensity score matching techniques with 
the conventional difference-in-differences estimation, to construct the relevant counterfactual 
under the hypothesis of selection on observables and unobservables. The treated and comparison 
individuals are followed for a period of five semesters before and after 2001, our reference 
period. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the Portuguese 
institutional context for the active labour market policy and the programmes we will evaluate. 
Section 3 presents the microeconometric framework to a multiple treatment evaluation. The 
dataset and the modelling strategy are described in Section 4 followed by Section 5 where the 
empirical analysis of participation on one of the selected treatment states is discussed and Section 
6 where the matching procedure is presented. Results from the selected econometric conditional 
difference-in-differences methodology are reported in Section 7. 
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2. - PORTUGUESE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 
 
2.1 – GENERAL INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The Portuguese ALMP framework uses a wide variety of programmes here aggregated into 
five major groups of intervention: 1) Direct Placement; 2) Job Counselling; 3) Employment 
Programmes; 4) Training Programmes; and 5) Professional Rehabilitation Programmes (designed, 
specifically, for the disabled)2. These programmes, in most cases, run continuously over time. 
They are also potentially available for any registered unemployed. Moreover, the individuals can 
participate repeatedly (and the data show they actually do it) over their observed unemployment 
spell.  
 This institutional framework does not fit into a pure (experimental) evaluation process, 
according to which a programme is administered at a fixed point in time with participants and 
non-participants randomly selected. But it does not represent any national idiosyncrasy. It is a 
typical institutional framework that can be found in any European country (Sianesi, 2004) where 
one can find a range of ongoing programmes and any unemployed individual can potentially 
become a participant. 
 
2.2 – ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT STATES 
The group of Employment Programmes (group 3 above), can be divided in: a) 
Training/Employment Programmes; b) Private Employment Incentives (for those who want to 
create their own employment); and c) the programmes involving the so-called Social 
Employment Market, which includes, as a key group, Public Employment Programmes. The sub-
group Training/Employment Programmes contains two main divisions: (i) vocational training; 
                                                 
2 Some of these major groups of intervention (e.g. Employment Programmes or Training Programmes) can in turn 
be sub-divided into sub-programmes comprised of an ample set of heterogeneous programmes. 
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and (ii) professional training programmes (or basic training, in the international literature). In our 
analysis we will not consider the Private Employment Incentives, given their specificity. The 
reduced number of participants creates serious problems of comparability. Programmes of 
vocational training will also be ignored since they present particular characteristics: programme 
duration can be much longer (up to three years) and the goals are clearly distinct.  
We will consider six different states of participation (including non-participation), which we 
will call treatment states: 1) No participation (NP); 2) Direct Placement (DP); 3) Job counselling 
(JC); 4) Training/Employment (TE); 5) Public Employment Programmes (PEP); and 6) Basic 
training (BT). We note that PEP is selected on the basis that it covers almost 100% of individuals 
in group c) above. 
The NP treatment state will be defined as the treatment state where no participation is 
observed in any of the programmes offered by the public employment service. They are of 
course registered unemployed individuals. 
The DP treatment state is considered, in this particular analysis, as a treatment state. It is one 
of the biggest groups identified by the Portuguese public employment service and, although it 
does not fit the traditional definition of an active labour market programme, individuals in this 
group benefit from the effort of the public employment service. It eases the match between 
supply and demand of labour. As a matter of fact, in the Portuguese institutional context even 
the non-participants are, in some way, “treated”, because they do take advantage of services 
provided by the public employment service (e.g. counselling, guidance and direct job placement). 
To participate in the DP treatment state only requires the register in the public employment 
service as the participation in the JC treatment state.  
 The JC treatment state is allocated to individuals that have benefited from technical 
services offered by the public employment service. These technical services are designed to 
promote the acquisition of effective individual’s ability to find labour market opportunities, to 
present an appealing CV or to conduct a job interview. 
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 TE programmes are characterized by the offer of some type of training to a registered 
unemployed (looking for a first employment or with some job experience). These programmes 
involve a real labour market experience. The ultimate goal of the TE treatment state is to increase 
the opportunities of labour market integration. The training programmes include Estágios 
Profissionais for individuals with the highest levels of formal education. 
PEP programmes (or Programas Ocupacionais) are mainly targeted to unemployed 
individuals in families with a per capita monthly income lower than the national minimum wage 
and to unemployment beneficiaries. Participants in these programmes are required to perform 
non market-oriented activities (i.e. activities which do not directly compete with existing labour 
market vacancies). Participation is not intended to exceed a maximum of twelve months. Any job 
or vocational training offered by the public employment service prevails over participation in 
Programas Ocupacionais. A refusal ends immediately entitlement to unemployment benefits and 
other income support schemes. In addition to participation in PEP programmes, participants 
must be involved in monitored job searching. 
 The BT programmes contain a wide range of training programmes but with certain 
common characteristics: participants are disadvantaged unemployed3 and the programme 
duration never exceeds one year. 
 The selected treatment states cover quite different and not comparable individuals. But 
we will argue that information on individual characteristics, once they are taken fully into 
account, allow us to evaluate the impact of the different treatments/policies. Our main 
assumptions are the following: (i) all the treatment states are potentially available for all the 
registered unemployed; (ii) all of the selected treatment states (except of course the NP treatment 
state) involve a participation period which does not exceed one year of duration; (iii) the 
characteristics that might decide the entry on a particular treatment state according to the 
                                                 
3 Some of the basic training courses have also employed individuals as beneficiaries but they are not considered in 
the dataset used in the empirical application. 
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legislation regulating the programmes are observable characteristics captured by the 
administrative data; and (iv) the aim of all the treatment states is to improve the employability of 
the unemployed participants. 
 Our aim is to offer a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the Portuguese active labour 
market policy by comparing, within a multiple treatment econometric framework, the treatment 
effects across the selected six treatment states. 
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3. - CAUSAL EVALUATION MODEL WITH MULTIPLE TREATMENTS 
 
To evaluate the Portuguese active labour market policy, under heterogeneous multiple 
treatments, we will apply the extension of Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) to the Rubin (1974) 
model of causality with a binary treatment framework. 
Following the notation of Lechner (2001), let us assume that a random individual i can 
participate in  1M  mutually exclusive treatments, denoted by M,...,1,0 4. The participation in 
treatment m  is indicated by  MD ,...,1,0 . The potential results, associated with these  1M  
possible treatments is defined by  MYYY ,...,, 10 . The number of observations in the population 
is N , with 


M
m
mNN
0
, where mN  is the number of participants in treatment m . As usual, for 
each participating individual only one outcome is observed, the outcome associated with his/her 
specific treatment. However, under certain assumptions, that limitation does not preclude 
estimation of the average causal effect of the treatment, even in a multiple treatment context. 
 In the framework of multiple treatments, Lechner (2001) defines several interest 
parameters, by presenting the necessary adjustments to the definition of average treatment effects 
used in the binary treatment case. In particular, he defines the expected effect of treatment m  
relatively to treatment l  for a participant drawn randomly from the population N, the average 
effect for a participant randomly selected from the group of participants in either m   or l , and 
the average effect for an individual randomly drawn from the population of participants in 
treatment m , only. For the multi-treatment version, the average treatment on the treated (the 
parameter that receives more attention in the binary evaluation literature), can be presented as a 
pairwise comparison of the effects of the treatments m  and l  for the participants in treatment 
m , this is: 
                                                 
4 Without loss of generality, treatment 0  denotes the absence of participation in any kind of policy (treatment). 
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     mDYEmDYEmDYYEATT lmlmlm , , (1) 
where lmATT ,  is the expected treatment effect for an individual randomly drawn from the 
population of participants in treatment m , in comparison with treatment l . It is important to 
note that the average treatment effects on the treated are not symmetric (i.e. 
mllm ATTATT ,,  ) if the participants in treatments m  and l  differ in a non-random fashion5.  
 The issue at stake is that the traditional model of causality (Rubin, 1974) assumes that in a 
non-experimental evaluation process it is not possible to identify the average causal effect of a 
treatment and therefore, the identification of that effect must rely on strong (non-testable) 
assumptions, which plausibility should be argued on a case-by-case basis depending on the 
underlying economic problem and data availability. The extension of the traditional model of 
causality to the case of a multiple treatment context takes on the same problem and makes the 
same assumption: the conditional independence assumption (CIA), or “strong uncounfoudness” 
(Imbens, 2000). In the multiple treatment context the CIA can be formalised as follows: 
   xxXDYYY M ,,...,, 10 , (2)
that is, all potential treatment outcomes are independent of the selection mechanism for any 
given value of a vector of characteristics, X , in a characteristics space,   (Lechner, 2002a). This 
means that the researcher observes all relevant characteristics which jointly influence the 
participation on a particular treatment and the subsequent potential outcome. 
 Additionally, the identification of the average causal effect requires that all individuals 
actually have the possibility of participation in all the alternative states of treatment, this is, it is 
required a support condition: 
  1,,...,0,0  xMmxXmDP  (3)
Since conditioning on all relevant observable characteristics may cause a problem of 
dimensionality. Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) show that the properties of the particular 
                                                 
5 We also note that, for lm  , 0,,  mmlm ATTATT .  
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balancing score, the propensity score, suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to overcome 
the “curse of dimensionality” also hold for the multiple treatment case. So, using the probability 
of participation in a treatment conditional on the observable characteristics, the lmATT ,  can be 
presented as: 
     mDlDXPYEEmDYEATT mlll
P
mlm
mll
  ,, , (4) 
 xP mll ,  is the conditional choice probability of a treatment, given either treatment m  or 
l , this is: 
         xPxP xPxXmlDlDPxP ml
l
mllmll
 ,,  (5) 
The lmATT ,  parameter can be then identified from an infinitely large random sample 
because all participation probabilities, as well as  mDYE m   and  lDXPYE mlll ),( , are 
identified (Lechner, 2002a and Lechner, 2002b). 
These results allow us to apply in the multiple-treatment context the appealing 
nonparametric propensity score matching methodology. A methodology not dependent of any 
functional form assumption and that allow us to correct two of the three important evaluation 
biases identified by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). Indeed, the matching methodology eliminates 
the bias due to a different support of the vector of characteristics X (that is, the violation of the 
common support condition resulting from having a different range of X for treated and non-
treated individuals) and the bias due to a different distribution of characteristics X over the 
region of common support. Although, it does not eliminate the third source of selectivity bias: 
the “selection on unobservables”, or the bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity among 
potential participants. The acceptance of the CIA is therefore very dependent on the nature of 
the data sources. 
The assumption that selection is driven only by observable characteristics is highly 
restrictive. For instance, some unobservable characteristics such as motivational differences 
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across registered individuals, while known by public employment officers, are likely not to be 
observed by a researcher with no full access to the raw information. The implication is that the 
available administrative data is likely to be insufficiently informative to make the CIA an 
acceptable assumption. We decided therefore to extend the work of Imbens (2000) and Lechner 
(2001) a little further and apply, in the multi-treatment context, the Heckman et al (1997) 
proposal to eliminate the selection on unobservables – the so-called conditional difference-in-
differences (CDiD) methodology. 
The CDiD estimator assumes the Bias Stability Assumption (BSA) (Heckman et al., 
1997). That is, that selection on unobservables is constant over time. It assumes, in particular, 
that the treatment has no impact in pre-treatment outcomes and therefore any observed 
difference in the pre-treatment period between participants and non-participants can be used to 
correct the observed differences in post-treatment outcomes. Under BSA, and denoting t  and 't  
as the time periods after and before the programme, respectively, the effect of treatment on the 
treated is then given by: 
ATT
Mt
ATT
Mt
ATT
CDiD ' , (6)
where ATTMt is the matching estimator for the effect of participation at time t and ATTMt '  is the 
matching estimator at time 't . Since we assume that everything not observable is constant over 
time, by differentiating twice over treated and non-treated individuals and before and after the 
event, one gets rid of the unobservable component presented in both groups.  
Less restrictive in terms of identification – one does not have to assume that the 
unobservable characteristics are identical across participants and non-participants – we believe 
that the CDiD estimator is preferred to the original propensity score matching estimator.  
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4 - DATA  
 
With the empirical evaluation carried out by this paper we pretend to assess the impact of 
the Portuguese Active Labour Market Policy on the participants in the main ongoing 
programmes considering a multi-treatment framework. For that purpose, the paper’s empirical 
evaluation relies on the dataset containing secondary information built from SIGAE the 
information system of the IEFP. It consists on an administrative dataset containing relevant 
information, as individual and labour market characteristics, related to all the individuals who had 
been registered by the public employment service. These records allow us to follow the registered 
labour history, including the participation on each ALMP and all (de)registration dates on a 
monthly basis6. 
The sample population considered on this particular paper corresponds to all the 
individuals registered as unemployed in the beginning of January 2001 and who never 
participated in an ALMP before that period or will never participate in another one after the 
analysed participation in one of the interest programmes. These restrictions to the sample 
construction try to avoid the contamination of the results for previous or subsequent 
participation in some kind of public employment programmes7, who could lead to questions of 
sequential treatments which are not address by the present work. 
The interested unemployed population is divided in different treatment sub-samples – the 
treatment states – according to the participation on a particular active programme, between 
                                                 
6 The knowledge of all the registration and de-registration dates is an important issue because they allow us to 
understand the participation’s path during the time period recorded by the public employment service. For instance, 
a registered individual recorded by IEFP as “openly” unemployed, can change his labour market status due to the 
participation on an ALMP and became again “openly” unemployed before permanently, or just temporarily, de-
register due to a transition to a labour market status characterised by a regular employment. 
7 Obviously, because we do not have information prior to January 1998 it is not possible to guarantee that the 
individual participated, or not, in previous ALMPs before that date. 
GEE 
THE PORTUGUESE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY DURING THE PERIOD 1998-2003 - A comprehensive conditional 
difference-in-differences application, Alcina Nunes and Paulino Teixeira 
 12
January and December 2001, or the non-participation in any of the considered programmes8. 
Thus the treated individuals cover all individuals that participated in one of the possible 
considered treatment states between the period 't  and t . These denote points corresponding to 
periods of time before and after a particular treatment state participation, respectively. 
The unemployment register at a specific period, t , after participation will still be assumed 
as the outcome variable within our evaluation process. So, a positive average treatment effect on 
the treated will represent the maintenance of the unemployment register and a failure of the 
official aim of the ALMPs. Their aim is to help the unemployed individuals to find regular 
employment and leave the unemployment registers. The average treatment effects were 
computed comparing the effects of participation in a particular programme with the participation 
in each of the other programmes and the non-participation case. This is, the outcome resulting 
from a participation in a treatment state will be compared with the outcome obtained by the 
alternative participation in each of the other treatment states. 
After deciding which were the interested evaluation sample and sub-samples, it was 
necessary to transform the original data in suitable empirical data. Figure 1 helps to explain the 
process.  
First of all, after dividing the interest unemployment population in the different treatment 
states, was necessary to aggregate in each 't  and t  points in time all the selected individuals. All 
of these individuals, except the ones in the non-participation state, started the participation at 
different months along 2001, not uniformly distributed. However for the non-participants the 
start dates are not clearly defined becoming necessary the definition of a “virtual” starting date. 
As was discussed before, rapidly changing labour market conditions could become a 
methodological problem. Since we decided to consider the participation over only a single year 
                                                 
8 A non-participant is defined as a register unemployed individual who has never been enrolled in any ALMP, 
however since we considered the non-participation as another treatment state, we will refer to all individuals as 
treated individuals. 
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the time changing in some variables is not significant so we will adopt an “inflated approach” 
(Lechner, 1999) that generates a well defined start date for all the non-participant individuals. 
Empirically that means to consider, each month, as a non-participant the individual who does not 
participate in one of the six selected treatment states. 
Since were considered initially twelve possible months of entry in a treatment state twelve 
groups of participants were also constructed for each one of the six treatment states. Then, for 
each group, the correspondent months for programme evaluation were identified. Connected 
each group to the time points in time where will be estimated the causal effects of the treatment 
states, the groups were pooled in six single treatment groups. 
Actually, another important choice in our empirical process of evaluation was the choice 
of the pre-treatment (t’) and post-treatment (t) points in time used to estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated. It will choose the relevant comparison time periods (t’ and t) as 
close as possible in order to make the social and economic contexts also as similar as possible. 
The matching empirical analysis must ensure that the treatment group is compared with a control 
group in the same economic environment. 
Another option which is maintained consists in comparing the outcome variable 
immediately after the beginning of participation. This option allows to consider the non-
treatment state as a different non-employment labour market state (Gerfin and Lechner, 2002 
and Sianesi, 2004). However the results of this selected approach should be seen with care. 
Participants in some programmes do not have the same amount of time to search for a new 
employment as non-participants. Therefore locking-in effects may occur and consequently the 
initial effect from participation on the programme could be negative (Ours, 2004). To exclude 
these potential negative effects we will start the evaluation of the outcome six months after the 
beginning of participation and we will extend the evaluation period during two and a half years. 
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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION ON A TREATMENT STATE 
 
5.1 – OBSERVABLE PRE-TREATMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
 The observable factors that could be potentially important to influence the decision of 
participation in one of the selected treatment states as well as the future potential outcomes are: 
(i) socio-demographic variables like sex, age, regional location or the responsibility for others; (ii) 
qualification variables like the educational level, the previous occupational group, the qualification 
rank; and, (iii) labour market variables like the reason for being unemployed, the unemployment 
category or a previous register in a public employment office. 
Details about the variables used in this paper, as well as their distribution between the 
treatment states are presented in Table 1. 
The predominant treatment state is by far the NP state with approximately 86% of the 
whole sample. Consequently only 14% of the selected unemployed population participated in a 
particular active programme, during the year 2001. Among those who effectively participated it is 
important to note the participants in JC programmes – almost 8% of the whole sample – and the 
individuals directly placed in a job by the public employment service, which represent 3% of the 
sample. The remaining selected treatment states present a very similar size concerning the 
number of participants. The whole sample is composed, in a higher percentage, by women, non-
qualified individuals or with no previous occupation, with lower levels of education and under 
the age of 40. 
Table 3.1 also shows there are differences related with gender, age, geographic location, 
educational levels, reasons for the unemployment register, number of registers per individual and 
previous occupational groups among the individuals distributed by the six treatment states. For 
example, the majority of women is less obvious in the NP and JC states, where the presence of 
relatively older individuals is also visible. The former treatment states are also the ones who bring 
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together a major number of unemployed who were dismissal or ended a temporary occupation. 
These groups have also participants with lower educational levels. PEP is the treatment state with 
a bigger percentage of non-qualified workers and the TE treatment state is the group with 
individuals who present higher educational levels and the group with more individuals looking 
for a first employment. Individuals with more than one register at the public service are more 
frequent in the DP, BT and PEP treatment states, respectively. 
The above mentioned differences are not a surprise since the programmes present 
particular institutional features. However an issue remains. Could unobservable variables as 
motivation, ability or some sort of administrative selection missing for the analysis be important? 
The answer to the question will rely on the application of the conditional difference-in-
differences estimator to try to capture the effect of hypothetical unobservable characteristics on 
the participant’s outcomes. 
 
5.2 – PROBABILITY OF TREATMENT STATE PARTICIPATION 
 This sub-section describes the results of the estimation of 2
)1( MM  , with )1( M  the 
number of treatment states, binomial logit models for the probability of individual participation in 
the selected treatment states. The results can be found in Table 2a), Table 2b) and Table 2c). 
 Lechner (2001) discusses if the conditional participation probabilities should be estimated 
for each combination of states separately as binary choices or whether the process should be 
modelled simultaneously with a discrete choice model including all relevant states. Both 
alternatives present advantages, namely in a practical level9. Choosing to estimate the binomial 
logit models, as did Larsson (2003) or Dorsett (2001), could be preferable since it avoids the 
                                                 
9 Lechner (2001) argues that if mllP  is modelled directly no information from sub-samples other than the 
containing participants in m  and l  is needed for the identification of equation (4) and we are basically back to the 
context of a single treatment. If all values of m  and l  are of interest, the whole sample is needed for identification. 
In that case either the binomial conditional probabilities could be estimated or a structural approach, where a 
complete choice problem is formulated in one model and estimated on the full sample, could be used. 
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restrictions associated with simultaneous models, namely the IIA assumption associated with the 
multinomial logit model. At a practical level, such an option could be more robust to error since 
a misspecification is one model will have fewer consequences than in the simultaneous model in 
which case all results will be compromised. Arguments in favour of a multinomial option (using, 
for example, a multinomial probit model as Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and Frolich (2004) could 
hold up at a practical level since there is less output to consider. 
 The results of binomial logit models estimation show the probability of participation in 
one treatment state, compared to the remaining ones. For example, Table 2a) shows the results 
of the probability of being in the DP treatment state compared to each one of the other options 
– NP, JC, TE, PEP and BT10, respectively. Given the large number of models – fifteen binomial 
logit models – and variables the results are extensive and will not be discussed. 
 Table 3 presents the number of observations in the treatment (in row) and control (in 
columns) groups, for each binomial logit model, and several tests related to the estimation of 
these models. With the more common tests, as the Pseudo- 2R , the F-test ( 2LR , with degrees 
of freedom in brackets) and the value of the log-likelihood, we present also the correction 
prediction rate for participants in the treatment state (CPRTG). Still since the dataset provides a 
full range of individual characteristics, we looked mainly at two aspects to obtain the preferred 
logit specifications: i) minimization of classification error11; and (ii) statistical significance of the 
included regressors. 
                                                 
10  The probability of being in NP, JC, TE, PEP or BT compared to DP is equal to one minus the probability of 
being in DP related to each other treatment state, respectively. So with six treatment states to be considered 
152
5)15(   binomial logit models were estimated. 
11 Minimization of classification error was suggested by Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman et al. (1999), who, 
assuming that the costs for the misclassification are equal for both groups, chose to maximize the within-sample 
correct prediction rates using the fraction of participants as the “cutoff” to predict someone to be a participant. In 
practice,   CPXP   is used to predict 1D , and   CPXP   to predict 0D , with  DEPC  . 
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 The observation of Table 2a), Table 2b) and Table 2c) allow us to verify that the majority 
of variables are statistical significant in each logit model. To illustrate, variables like sex, age, 
educational levels and the reasons for the unemployment register perform particularly well in all 
models. In table 3 we can also verify that the variables in each model are jointly statistically 
significant. These results stress the findings that there are differences in the composition of the 
treatment states and represent a good indication that a matching procedure could produce 
effective results. 
Concerning the minimization of the classification error (Table 3) it is possible to find a 
within-sample correct prediction rate for participants in the treatment state in the 63-78% range. 
The values indicate that the estimated probability of treatment participation is generally well 
classified in 63 to 78% of the cases.  
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6. THE MATCHING PROCEDURE 
 
 Given the participation probability (propensity score), in other words, the probability of a 
given individual being in a particular treatment state and not in one of the alternative ones, the 
next step is to perform matching on the propensity score. 
For computational reasons, associated with the dimension of the dataset, we selected the 
nearest neighbour matching estimator, with replacement (within a common support region) of 
non-participant observations. This is a highly intuitive procedure which requires finding a 
pairwise matching for every treated individual, obtained by choosing the closest non-treated 
individual given its propensity score. The replacement option allows us to use the same non-
participant individual more than once if it happens to be a good match for participants. 
Before the matching procedure, it is necessary to guarantee the common support 
condition. That is, to ensure that for a given propensity score, the two possible treatment states 
can be observed. In non-experimental studies if one wants to obtain the counterfactual for a 
given individual in the treatment group, someone similar in the non-treatment state has to be 
found. This is exactly what the common support region is supposed to replicate. Therefore we 
will only use values of the propensity score for which both the density of the treatment group 
and the comparisons groups are positive. 
In practice, this implies that some of the observations at the tails of the propensity score 
distributions will be eliminated if they do not cover the exact same interval. Since we estimate 
pairwise effects between each of the different six treatment states the requirement is that all 
observations in the treatment state m for which there are no comparison observation in treatment 
state l (   lmMlm  ,,...1,0, ) are removed from the sub-sample. 
 Table 4 shows the number of observations lost across the different treatment states due 
to the imposition of the common support requirement. This loss is between 0 and nearly 5%, 
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with the biggest percentage found in the treatment states with fewer observations (in absolute 
terms though, NP is the group with the largest number of observations lost). 
 The next step is to check the quality of the implemented matching procedure, that is, 
whether our matching produced balanced characteristics across the treatment and non-treatment 
groups. In other words, the variables included in the propensity score model should guarantee 
that, for a given propensity score, the exposure to treatment is random. Table 5 shows the results 
of our testing.  
The standardized bias suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is often used in the 
evaluation literature (e.g. Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Larsson, 2003; and Dorsett, 2001). Recalling, 
this indicator is defined as the difference in the mean of the treated and comparison samples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in both groups. Given the 
number of states and variables, we will not comment on every single result. However it seems 
clear that our matching generated a substantial reduction of the standardized differences among 
the variables, as can be seen in Table 5. Indeed, we found mean standardized differences larger 
than 20% (and never lower than 10%) before matching, while after matching the bias lies 
between 1.14 and 8.55%. Clearly there is plenty of evidence that the matching procedure was able 
to balance the characteristics in the treatment and the matched comparison groups.  
We applied also other balancing tests. The t-test on differences in means between the 
treated and comparison groups, before and after matching, for each variable included in the 
matching procedure. This test yielded statistically significant differences before matching but not 
after matching, which is a further indication that matching has been effective. Moreover, after 
matching there should be no systematic differences in the distribution of the covariates between 
the two groups (participants and matched non-participants). The pseudo- 2R  after matching 
should be fairly low. As Table 5 shows, this is true in our case. Finally, the log-likelihood ratio 
points in the same direction, indicating a joint significance of all variables before but not after 
matching for some of the estimated models. 
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7. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
Our goal is to measure the causal effects of participation in each one of the selected 
treatments states in a multiple treatment framework with a view to evaluation of employability of 
participants, both in the short and long-run. Registration at the public employment service 
(yes/no) is our outcome measure.  
Table 6 organizes the results in two main columns ( ATTMt '  and ATTMt ), while Table 7 
presents the results of the CDiD estimator ( ATTCDiD ). In particular, Table 6 (column ATTMt ' ) 
presents the difference, in terms of unemployment register, between the matched participant and 
non-participants before treatment. The column ATTMt of the table, in turn, shows the same 
difference but after treatment. 
In the context of the econometric methodology presented, we will assume that the true 
effect of a treatment state before the beginning of participation is null. Thus the changes in the 
registered unemployment rates of each group are a good estimator of the unobserved differences 
among treated and comparison matched individuals. This assumption allows us to estimate the 
potentially bias in ATTMt  (which only assumes the conditional independence assumption). In other 
words, if we further assume that this bias is on average identical to the t  and 't  points in time 
chosen – the bias stability assumption – we can use the bias computed in 't  to correct the 
estimate of the average effect of the treatment on the treated we get for t . 
In Table 6 each 6x6 matrix includes all selected measures, from semester 1 to semester 5. 
The programme effects, column ATTMt , are presented off the main diagonal. A positive number 
indicates that the effect on the participants in the programme, compared to the participating 
individuals in the comparison groups, is negative in terms of employability. For example, six 
months after the beginning of participation (case 1t ) in a PEP, the probability of a participant 
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being a registered unemployed is 22.3 percentage points higher than a non-participant (NP). The 
corresponding effect is of 50 percentage points compared to those in the DP state, to almost 
53% compared to the BT state and to 66% compared to the TE state. The bigger percentage of 
unemployment registers for PEPs participants it is only reduced if we compare the PEP 
participation with the JC state – the percentage of unemployment rates is still higher for the PEP 
state but now the difference is of 5.6%, only.  
After two and a half years, the participation on a PEP programme still compares relatively 
badly except when compared to the NP treatment state. In semester 5 participants in this 
programme will have 3% less probability of being registered as unemployed than a NP 
participant. This long-run effect is also present in the case of the other comparison groups.  
In contrast, the TE participants present lower probabilities of having an unemployment 
register than the participants in other treatment options, six months after the beginning of 
participation. The results, although remaining generally positive in terms of the employability of 
TE participants, are reduced in the long-run. Compared to the DP state, for instance, the 
participants in the TE treatment present a higher probability of being unemployed. 
In general, we might say that in the short-run PEP and JC treatment states seem to 
perform poorly when compared to DP, TE, BT and even NP treatment states. The programmes 
which seem to perform better, in the short–run, are BT and TE. Performing even better than 
DP. We think, however, that these short-run findings are not due directly to the performance of 
the programmes themselves but to administrative reasons: Participation in BT and TE implies an 
immediate unemployment de-registration. In this case, only the long-run effect measures the 
impact of programme participation. Another explanation concerns the locking-in effects due to a 
lower amount of free time to look for a regular job. 
 It should be pointed out, at this stage, that all programmes seemed to produce better 
results than the non-participation treatment state, as is supposed to happen to any active labour 
market programme. After 4 or 5 semesters the probability of being unemployed is lower for DP, 
GEE 
THE PORTUGUESE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY DURING THE PERIOD 1998-2003 - A comprehensive conditional 
difference-in-differences application, Alcina Nunes and Paulino Teixeira 
 22
JC, TE, PEP and BT treatments than for non-participants (NP). However, among the effective 
participation in a particular active programme, the PEP state is the one that presents the worst 
results. These are followed by JC programmes. After 5 semesters, the programme that performs 
better is DP. 
 The above results are not net of the unobserved heterogeneity bias. It is possible to 
observe before participation (column ATTMt '  in Table 6) differences in the unemployment’s 
register rates among the state’s participants. This indicates the existence of some unobserved 
heterogeneity. As mentioned above, in order to estimate an unbiased average treatment effect on 
the treated we implemented a conditional difference-in-differences estimator, ATTCDiD . Our 
implementation uses two approaches. The first approach assumes 't  symmetric to t, which means 
that, given t0 (the month where the program begins), the outcome variable is evaluated 1, 2, …, 5 
semesters before and after t0. The acronym  tt '  denotes this case, for t = 1, 2,…, 5. The 
second approach considers 't  fixed at one semester before t0 and then t equal to 1, 2, …, and 5 
semesters, respectively. This case is denoted by the acronym  1' t . The results for both 
approaches are presented in Table 7 and Figures 2-7. 
 Figure 2, for example, shows the evolution of the average treatment effects for 
participants in each treatment state. We note that the zero axis line corresponds to the reference 
treatment state (NP). Any point above zero indicates registered unemployment rates larger than 
the ones found for the reference treatment group. Any point below zero, the opposite. In the 
Figure is possible to observe that the two mentioned approaches present different results for 
longer time periods but in the short-run the patterns are identical. Having as reference the NP 
treatment state, all the programmes present better results except the JC and PEP states. The 
explanation for the worse results of the PEPs, for example, could rest in a probable reduction of 
job search activities during participation, which can last for twelve months. The better results of 
DP, TE and BT could rest in administrative reasons. Their participant individuals leave the 
GEE 
THE PORTUGUESE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY DURING THE PERIOD 1998-2003 - A comprehensive conditional 
difference-in-differences application, Alcina Nunes and Paulino Teixeira 
 23
unemployment register at the beginning of participation. Over time, however, the effects of all 
treatment states tend to converge. In the long run all the treatment states seem to perform better 
than the non-participation state. 
 Figures 3-7 give more information about the specific active labour market programmes. 
In these figures each reference active programme is compared to the others and to the state of 
non-participation. 
 The DP reference treatment group can be observed in Figure 3. In the short-run only TE 
and BT perform better. A reason is probably the duration of these programmes. They can last 
twelve months and their participants must leave the unemployment register during the 
participation period. Indeed if we observe the twelve months period we find worse results for the 
BT and TE treatment states than for the DP treatment state. The better results of the DP 
treatment state remains in the long-run. A possible explanation is that the individuals directly 
placed by the public employment service in a regular job could be better adapted to the needs of 
the labour market. Thus, it is easier to match their job demand with the available job offers. 
 The results of the selected treatment states having as reference the JC programmes can be 
observed in Figure 4. Only the PEP treatment state participants perform worse. The relative 
position of the JC programmes remains over time.  
 Figure 5 shows the results of the average treatment effect on the treated (compared to the 
TE treatment state). The TE treatment outperforms all other programmes both in the short- and 
the long-run, although the gap is clearly lower in the long-run.  
The training programmes seem to give participants some persistent effect in terms of 
labour market opportunities as we can see in Figure 6, which presents the BT treatment state as 
the reference group. In fact, when using the differences in registered unemployment rates for 
1t  it is clear that a participation on BT produces better results than a participation in other 
types of active labour market programmes. When using the differences in the unemployment 
register rates for tt   the absolute better results of the BT treatment state are not so obvious 
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and are quite similar to the results obtained for the TE treatment state. Since TE programmes 
have an important training component, the conclusion that training generates greater 
employability is reinforced. 
 Finally, we can observe that the PEP-type programme, the reference treatment state in 
Figure 7, has the worst results among all active labour market programmes. In the short-run, 
participation is worse than non-participation (NP). Only after five semesters is this finding 
reversed. Similar results were reported by Gerfin and Lechner (2002), who admit that the 
additional amount of human capital obtained in PEP-type programmes is too small to 
compensate for the initial (negative) effects due to a reduced job search. 
GEE 
THE PORTUGUESE ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY DURING THE PERIOD 1998-2003 - A comprehensive conditional 
difference-in-differences application, Alcina Nunes and Paulino Teixeira 
 25
 
8 - CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The unemployed in the public employment service can participate in a wide variety of 
active labour market programmes. To fully evaluate the impact of each selected programme we 
decided to extend the work of Imbens (1999) and Lechner (2001) and apply, in a multi-treatment 
context, the Heckman et al. (1997) difference-in-differences approach to eliminate the selection 
on unobservables. We have therefore reinforced the rejection of the assumption that selection 
into participation is exclusively driven by observable characteristics. 
 Assuming six different treatment states (including the non-participation state), our 
findings suggest that ALMPs have an impact in long-run. In the short-run, however, there is a lot 
to improve. PEP-type programmes in particular perform very poorly, while programmes in which 
there is some training component seem to have a greater impact on employability. Given the 
estimated long-run effects, the major lesson drawn from this comprehensive empirical evaluation 
exercise is that programme evaluation restricted to the short run impact may not be totally 
informative.  
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ANNEX: FIGURES AND TABLES  
 
Figure 1: Participation and Non-Participation Groups and Pre and Post-treatment Points 
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Table 1: Number of Observations and Pre-Treatment Characteristics 
 
 NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
Number of individuals 
           (in %) 
147548 
(85.65) 
5414 
(3.14) 
13581 
(7.88) 
1686 
(0.98) 
2550 
(1.48) 
1484 
(0.86) 
Variables :       
Sex (Men) (in %) 40.08 34.97 41.67 21.00 22.94 23.99 
Age (in years) 37.44 30.59 40.79 28.66 36.99 32.13 
Persons at charge (in %) 47.58 42.93 49.91 33.63 60.00 52.63 
Geographic location (in %)       
     Norte 40.12 21.33 60.56 36.60 30.28 22.71 
     Centro 11.50 35.30 9.82 26.99 20.94 15.50 
     Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 40.04 23.68 26.03 23.07 27.41 43.26 
     Alentejo 5.29 4.71 1.84 7.59 17.37 16.11 
     Algarve 3.05 14.98 1.75 5.75 4.00 2.43 
Educational level (in %)       
     None 6.43 3.86 7.08 0.83 9.10 2.16 
     Primary (4 years) 34.07 23.68 41.30 17.97 36.16 19.95 
     Compulsory Secondary (9 
years) 
34.70 44.79 31.44 27.34 35.77 54.72 
     Secondary (12 years) 16.09 21.70 13.08 21.83 14.90 20.01 
     Superior (15 or more years) 8.72 5.97 7.11 32.03 4.08 3.17 
Previous occupational group (in %)       
     - None 11.24 17.64 8.67 45.02 8.98 13.34 
     - Management 1.43 0.35 1.23 0.53 0.39 0.20 
     - Scientific specialist 3.79 2.07 4.15 3.20 2.35 2.02 
     - Technical worker 6.78 4.17 7.63 2.85 3.80 4.25 
     - Administrative worker 13.22 10.79 13.70 8.96 14.00 13.88 
     - Seller 15.52 20.04 12.96 12.34 16.63 21.63 
     - Farmer 4.60 3.36 3.70 3.74 8.63 5.26 
     - Manufacturer’s worker 14.87 11.95 18.28 6.94 10.71 11.12 
     - Machine’s operator 9.64 8.52 11.43 2.37 6.71 6.13 
     - No-qualified worker 18.92 21.11 18.25 14.06 27.80 22.17 
First employment (in %) 11.24 17.66 8.70 45.02 8.98 13.48 
Re-application at IEFP (in %) 48.95 62.10 40.00 54.09 60.12 62.00 
Reasons for unemployment (in %)       
     - End of formal education 9.95 15.87 7.14 38.14 5.96 12.33 
     - Dismissal 38.39 25.38 48.47 16.07 32.04 26.48 
     - End of temporary occupation 34.74 41.98 31.23 19.87 39.73 36.93 
     - Re-application 2.81 5.84 2.49 10.14 5.77 7.35 
     - Other 14.11 10.94 10.68 15.78 16.51 16.91 
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Table 2a): Determinants of Participation on DP Programmes 
DP (compared with) Variables NP JC TE PEP BT 
      
Sex -0.058 
(***) 
(0.032) 
0.106 (**) 
(0.045) 
0.548 (*) 
(0.076) 
0.685 (*) 
(0.065) 
0.511 (*) 
(0.076) 
Age -0.051 
(*) 
(0.002) 
-0.083 (*) 
(0.002) 
-0.017 (*) 
(0.005) 
-0.053 (*) 
(0.003) 
-0.026 (*) 
(0.004) 
Persons at charge 0.046 (0.033) 
0.032 
(0.045) 
-0.239 (*) 
(0.082) 
-0.238 (*) 
(0.059) 
-0.250 (*) 
(0.073) 
Geographic location      
     Norte -2.202 
(*) 
(0.052) 
-3.409 (*) 
(0.092) 
-1.284 (*) 
(0.134) 
-2.022 (*) 
(0.126) 
-1.932 (*) 
(0.188) 
     Centro -0.477 
(*) 
(0.048) 
-0.966 (*) 
(0.093) 
-0.301 (**) 
(0.134) 
-1.052 (*) 
(0.124) 
-1.032 (*) 
(0.189) 
     Lisboa e Vale do Tejo -1.992 
(*) 
(0.050) 
-2.207 (*) 
(0.091) 
-0.786 (*) 
(0.135) 
-1.609 (*) 
(0.123) 
-2.438 (*) 
(0.181) 
     Alentejo -1.744 
(*) 
(0.077) 
-1.355 (*) 
(0.133) 
-1.203 (*) 
(0.171) 
-2.860 (*) 
(0.143) 
-3.147 (*) 
(0.200) 
     Algarve (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Educational level      
     None 0.579 
(*) 
(0.105) 
0.670 (*) 
(0.143) 
3.590 (*) 
(0.310) 
-0.382 (***) 
(0.204) 
0.481 
(0.297) 
     Primary (4 years) 0.549 
(*) 
(0.080) 
0.627 (*) 
(0.113) 
2.172 (*) 
(0.142) 
-0.243 
(0.177) 
-0.280 
(0.223) 
     Compulsory Secondary (9 years) 0.520 
(*) 
(0.073) 
0.460 (*) 
(0.102) 
2.138 (*) 
(0.115) 
-0.207 
(0.167) 
-1.007 (*) 
(0.207) 
     Secondary (12 years) 0.552 
(*) 
(0.072) 
0.497 (*) 
(0.101) 
1.726 (*) 
(0.108) 
-0.132 
(0.165) 
-0.744 (*) 
(0.206) 
     Superior (15 or more years) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Previous occupational group      
     - None -0.031 (0.565) 
1.330 (***) 
(0.784) 
-0.206 
(0.877) 
-0.314 
(1.429) 
1.224 
(0.970) 
     - Management -0.886 
(*) 
(0.238) 
-1.231 (*) 
(0.280) 
0.114 
(0.474) 
-0.251 
(0.440) 
0.597 
(0.683) 
     - Scientific specialist -0.491 
(*) 
(0.116) 
-1.136 (*) 
(0.152) 
0.907 (*) 
(0.219) 
-0.529 (**) 
(0.229) 
-0.539 (**) 
(0.280) 
     - Technical worker -0.275 
(*) 
(0.080) 
-0.586 (*) 
(0.106) 
0.545 (*) 
(0.201) 
-0.011 
(0.152) 
-0.004 
(0.176) 
     - Administrative worker -0.285 
(*) 
(0.057) 
-0.561 (*) 
(0.079) 
0.230 (***) 
(0.137) 
-0.364 (*) 
(0.103) 
-0.168 
(0.120) 
     - Seller -0.143 
(*) 
(0.046) 
-0.159 (**) 
(0.068) 
0.155 
(0.112) 
0.211 (**) 
(0.084) 
0.056 
(0.099) 
     - Farmer -0.436 
(*) 
(0.084) 
-0.486 (*) 
(0.115) 
-0.414 (**) 
(0.177) 
0.074 
(0.131) 
0.045) 
(0.174) 
     - Manufacturer’s worker 0.013  (0.053) 
-0.161 (**) 
(0.071) 
0.181 
(0.130) 
0.360 (*) 
(0.096) 
0.142 
(0.116) 
     - Machine’s operator 0.044 (0.059) 
-0.115 
(0.081) 
0.783 (*) 
(0.187) 
0.400 (*) 
(0.113) 
0.256 (**) 
(0.141) 
     - No-qualified worker (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
First employment -0.131 (0.565) 
-1.785 (**) 
(0.783) 
-0.058 
(0.874) 
0.230 
(1.427) 
-1.032 
(0.967) 
Re-application at IEFP 0.342 
(*) 
(0.031) 
0.641 (*) 
(0.043) 
0.117 (***) 
(0.069) 
0.165 (*) 
(0.058) 
0.121 (**) 
(0.068) 
Reasons for unemployment register      
     - End of formal education (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
     - Dismissal -0.128 (0.080) 
-0.372 (*) 
(0.115) 
0.511 (*) 
(0.143) 
-0.739 (*) 
(0.151) 
0.049 
(0.158) 
     - End of temporary occupation -0.058 (0.077) 
-0.298 (*) 
(0.113) 
0.729 (*) 
(0.138) 
-0.726 (*) 
(0.148) 
0.095 
(0.154) 
     - Re-application 0.354 
(*) 
(0.087) 
0.336 (**) 
(0.132) 
-0.050 
(0.142) 
-0.613 (*) 
(0.166) 
-0.283 
(0.174) 
     - Other -0.073 (0.077) 
0.085 
(0.111) 
0.005 
(0.130) 
-0.838 (*) 
(0.143) 
-0.242 
(0.152) 
Constant -0.523 
(*) 
(0.122) 
3.902 (*) 
(0.185) 
0.145 
(0.246) 
4.728 (*) 
(0.262) 
4.502 (*) 
(0.333) 
Notes: (a) denotes the reference variable. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2b): Determinants of Participation on JC Programmes 
JC (compared with) Variables NP JC TE PEP 
     
Sex -0.073 
(*) 
0.020 
0.447 (*) 
0.074 
0.583 (*) 
0.057 
0.464 (*) 
0.074 
Age 0.024 
(*) 
0.001 
0.062 (*) 
0.004 
0.031 (*) 
0.003 
0.051 (*) 
0.004 
Persons at charge -0.015 0.019 
-0.225 (*) 
0.077 
-0.320 (*) 
0.051 
-0.232 (*) 
0.068 
Geographic location     
     Norte 0.948 
(*) 
0.069 
1.635 (*) 
0.153 
1.575 (*) 
0.132 
1.328 (*) 
0.200 
     Centro 0.392 
(*) 
0.073 
0.276 (***) 
0.160 
0.085 
0.137 
-0.160 
0.206 
     Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 0.050 0.070 
0.936 (*) 
0.157 
0.718 (*) 
0.133 
-0.326 (**) 
0.197 
     Alentejo -0.475 
(*) 
0.094 
-0.056 
0.196 
-1.289 (*) 
0.152 
-1.777 (*) 
0.219 
     Algarve (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Educational level     
     None -0.053 0.063 
2.866 (*) 
0.300 
-0.672 (*) 
0.178 
0.061 
0.280 
     Primary (4 years) 0.090 
(***) 
0.052 
1.431 (*) 
0.131 
-0.472 (*) 
0.158 
-0.552 (*) 
0.208 
     Compulsory Secondary (9 years) 0.155 
(*) 
0.048 
1.455 (*) 
0.106 
-0.399 (*) 
0.148 
-1.261 (*) 
0.192 
     Secondary (12 years) 0.119 
(**) 
0.048 
1.090 (*) 
0.098 
-0.466 (*) 
0.148 
-1.120 (*) 
0.191 
     Superior (15 or more years) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Previous occupational group     
     - None -0.551 0.464 
-0.283 
1.122 
-17.188 
. 
0.381 
0.957 
     - Management 0.021 0.088 
1.022 (*) 
0.377 
1.224 (*) 
0.346 
1.877 (*) 
0.599 
     - Scientific specialist 0.450 
(*) 
0.062 
1.709 (*) 
0.193 
0.858 (*) 
0.190 
0.531 (**) 
0.242 
     - Technical worker 0.229 
(*) 
0.043 
0.988 (*) 
0.186 
0.687 (*) 
0.130 
0.630 (*) 
0.161 
     - Administrative worker 0.163 
(*) 
0.035 
0.640 (*) 
0.128 
0.321 (*) 
0.086 
0.449 (*) 
0.111 
     - Seller 0.017 0.034 
0.325 (*) 
0.112 
0.387 (*) 
0.078 
0.202 (**) 
0.098 
     - Farmer 0.073 0.052 
-0.004 
0.169 
0.356 (*) 
0.111 
0.534 (*) 
0.168 
     - Manufacturer’s worker 0.113 
(*) 
0.031 
0.384 (*) 
0.125 
0.593 (*) 
0.084 
0.365 (*) 
0.112 
     - Machine’s operator 0.042 0.035 
0.872 (*) 
0.183 
0.538 (*) 
0.100 
0.500 (*) 
0.137 
     - No-qualified worker (a) (a) (a) (a) 
First employment 0.892 
(**) 
0.464 
0.423 
1.119 
17.567 (*) 
0.131 
0.382 
0.949 
Re-application at IEFP -0.230 
(*) 
0.020 
-0.545 (*) 
0.067 
-0.388 (*) 
0.051 
-0.456 (*) 
0.066 
Reasons for unemployment register     
     - End of formal education (a) (a) (a) (a) 
     - Dismissal 0.300 
(*) 
0.067 
0.779 (*) 
0.143 
-0.476 (*) 
0.151 
0.550 (*) 
0.168 
     - End of temporary occupation 0.328 
(*) 
0.067 
0.884 (*) 
0.139 
-0.567 (*) 
0.149 
0.479 (*) 
0.164 
     - Re-application 0.252 
(*) 
0.081 
-0.540 (*) 
0.146 
-0.896 (*) 
0.172 
-0.537 (*) 
0.189 
     - Other -0.113 
(**) 
0.064 
-0.305 (**) 
0.130 
-1.001 (*) 
0.144 
-0.273 (***) 
0.162 
Constant -4.158 
(*) 
0.107 
-2.855 (*) 
0.245 
0.435 (***) 
0.240 
0.508 
0.321 
Notes: (a) denotes the reference variable. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2c): Determinants of Participation on TE, PEP and BT Programmes 
 TE (compared with) PEP (compared with) BT (compared with) 
Variables NP PEP BT NP BT NP 
       
Sex -0.558 
(*) 
0.063 
-0.103 
0.100 
-0.300 (*) 
0.107 
-0.643 (*) 
0.050 
-0.163 (***) 
0.088 
-0.590 (*) 
0.065 
Age -0.039 
(*) 
0.004 
-0.037 (*) 
0.005 
-0.014 (**) 
0.006 
-0.009 (*) 
0.002 
0.031 (*) 
0.004 
-0.029 (*) 
0.003 
Persons at charge 0.212 
(*) 
0.067 
-0.129 
0.088 
-0.060 
0.100 
0.314 (*) 
0.044 
-0.010 
0.077 
0.307 (*) 
0.059 
Geographic location (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
     Norte -0.935 
(*) 
0.116 
-0.221 
0.185 
-0.419 (***) 
0.229 
-0.483 (*) 
0.110 
-0.092 
0.217 
-0.273 
0.180 
     Centro -0.186 0.118 
-0.485 (**) 
0.191 
-0.664 (*) 
0.235 
0.378 (*) 
0.112 
-0.106 
0.221 
0.536 (*) 
0.183 
     Lisboa e Vale do Tejo -1.300 
(*) 
0.119 
-0.400 (**) 
0.187 
-1.304 (*) 
0.226 
-0.528 (*) 
0.109 
-0.922 (*) 
0.212 
0.433 (**) 
0.174 
     Alentejo -0.598 
(*) 
0.141 
-1.423 (*) 
0.212 
-1.814 (*) 
0.250 
0.924 (*) 
0.114 
-0.341 
0.223 
1.331 (*) 
0.183 
     Algarve (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Educational level       
     None -2.876 
(*) 
0.284 
-3.805 (*) 
0.335 
-2.985 (*) 
0.402 
0.754 (*) 
0.152 
0.745 (**) 
0.312 
0.103 
0.255 
     Primary (4 years) -1.472 
(*) 
0.105 
-2.030 (*) 
0.196 
-2.072 (*) 
0.239 
0.604 (*) 
0.136 
-0.107 
0.251 
0.682 (*) 
0.188 
     Compulsory Secondary (9 years) -1.491 
(*) 
0.081 
-1.887 (*) 
0.176 
-2.717 (*) 
0.217 
0.555 (*) 
0.129 
-0.836 (*) 
0.238 
1.370 (*) 
0.174 
     Secondary (12 years) -1.075 
(*) 
0.074 
-1.685 (*) 
0.171 
-2.270 (*) 
0.212 
0.563 (*) 
0.128 
-0.629 (*) 
0.239 
1.166 (*) 
0.173 
     Superior (15 or more years) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
Previous occupational group       
     - None 0.016 0.741 
-0.220 
2.122 
2.004 
1.350 
-0.023 
1.013 
18.361 
. 
-1.570 (**) 
0.712 
     - Management -1.148 
(*) 
0.349 
0.128 
0.571 
0.746 
0.805 
-0.962 (*) 
0.325 
0.637 
0.683 
-1.611 (*) 
0.585 
     - Scientific specialist -1.253 
(*) 
0.169 
-1.137 (*) 
0.267 
-1.207 (*) 
0.330 
-0.283 (***) 
0.166 
-0.288 
0.306 
-0.220 
0.219 
     - Technical worker -0.818 
(*) 
0.168 
-0.169 
0.223 
-0.038 
0.244 
-0.455 (*) 
0.117 
0.032 
0.192 
-0.461 (*) 
0.146 
     - Administrative worker -0.470 
(*) 
0.114 
-0.349 (**) 
0.148 
-0.146 
0.161 
-0.111 
0.074 
0.168 
0.126 
-0.293 (*) 
0.096 
     - Seller -0.296 
(*) 
0.099 
0.001 
0.124 
-0.116 
0.134 
-0.339 (*) 
0.064 
-0.147 
0.109 
-0.178 (**) 
0.081 
     - Farmer 0.143 0.146 
0.252 
0.179 
0.361 (**) 
0.210 
-0.225 (*) 
0.084 
-0.030 
0.166 
-0.260 (**) 
0.132 
     - Manufacturer’s worker -0.186 0.116 
0.153 
0.143 
0.036 
0.158 
-0.392 (*) 
0.074 
-0.153 
0.129 
-0.128 
0.099 
     - Machine’s operator -0.813 
(*) 
0.173 
-0.312 
0.206 
-0.425 (***) 
0.224 
-0.425 (*) 
0.088 
-0.060 
0.158 
-0.303 (**) 
0.121 
     - No-qualified worker (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
First employment 0.171 0.738 
0.422 
2.121 
-1.516 
1.343 
-0.118 
1.012 
-18.057 (*) 
0.175 
1.105 
0.709 
Re-application at IEFP 0.231 
(*) 
0.055 
0.008 
0.083 
0.052 
0.090 
0.149 (*) 
0.044 
0.054 
0.076 
0.184 (*) 
0.058 
Reasons for unemployment register       
     - End of formal education (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) (a) 
     - Dismissal -0.502 
(*) 
0.118 
-1.337 (*) 
0.182 
-0.488 (*) 
0.190 
0.610 (*) 
0.126 
0.977 (*) 
0.185 
-0.309 (**) 
0.140 
     - End of temporary occupation -0.612 
(*) 
0.114 
-1.454 (*) 
0.176 
-0.628 (*) 
0.184 
0.628 (*) 
0.124 
0.932 (*) 
0.179 
-0.269 (**) 
0.136 
     - Re-application 0.774 
(*) 
0.110 
-0.575 (*) 
0.190 
-0.311 
0.201 
1.010 (*) 
0.139 
0.422 (**) 
0.203 
0.530 (*) 
0.152 
     - Other 0.157 0.101 
-0.764 (*) 
0.166 
-0.230 
0.176 
0.793 (*) 
0.120 
0.700 (*) 
0.176 
0.092 
0.134 
Constant -0.781 
(*) 
0.198 
4.036 (*) 
0.325 
3.960 (*) 
0.385 
-4.532 (*) 
0.207 
-0.405 
0.378 
-4.609 (*) 
0.288 
Notes: (a) denotes the reference variable. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 3: Tests for the Binomial Logit Model 
 DP (compared with) JC (compared with) TE (compared with) PEP (compared with) 
BT 
(compared 
with) 
     
 NP JC TE PEP BT NP TE PEP BT NP PEP BT NP BT PEP 
Observations (N) 152962 18995 7100 7964 6898 161129 15267 16131 15065 149234 4236 3170 150098 4034 149032 
N 5414 5414 5414 5414 5414 13581 13581 13581 13581 1686 1686 1686 2550 2550 1484 
TG 
% 3.53 28.5 76.25 67.98 78.49 8.43 88.96 84.19 90.15 1.13 39.8 53.19 1.70 63.21 1.0 
N 147548 13581 1686 2550 1484 147548 1686 2550 1484 147548 2550 1484 147548 1484 147548 
CG 
% 96.46 71.5 23.75 32.02 21.51 91.57 11.04 15.81 9.85 98.87 60.2 46.81 98.3 36.79 99.0 
Pseudo-
2R  (%) 12.39 30.82 18.15 16.17 13.4 4.09 29.08 16.87 23.65 14.17 25.42 21.16 5.49 9.5 7.04 
 262LR  5800.53 
(0.000) 
6996.3 
(0.000) 
1412.82 
(0.000) 
1615.23 
(0.000) 
962.57 
(0.000) 
3812.3 
(0.000) 
3085.14 
(0.000) 
2375.29 
(0.000) 
2293.2 
(0.000) 
2617.47 
(0.000) 
1447.43 
(0.000) 
927.19 
(0.000) 
1418.12 
(0.000) 
504.02 
(0.000) 
1170.63 
(0.000) 
Log-Likelihood -20506.034 -7853.9152 -3185.3842 -4185.9202 -3110.3723 -44678.769 -3761.527 -5853.1116 -3701.149 -7926.3089 -2123.7195 -1727.2436 -12210.904 -2401.6096 -7731.6506 
CPRTG (%) 67.53 75.66 72.63 69.04 66.01 64.44 78.28 73.85 76.57 65.3 65.54 63.76 63.84 62.78 70.15 
Notes: Subscripts TG and CG denote treatment and control groups, respectively. CPR is the correction prediction rate for participants 
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Table 4: Observations Lost Due to the Common Support Condition 
   Treatment Group 
  
 
  
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
     147548 5414 13581 1686 2550 1484 
   
Observations lost   1 1 0 0 0 
(in percentage)  0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 NP 
Observations after matching  5413 13580 1686 2550 1484 
Observations lost 2550  566 0 1 1 
(in percentage) 1.73  4.17 0.00 0.04 0.07 DP 
Observations after matching 144998  13015 1686 2549 1483 
Observations lost 33 16  3 2 6 
(in percentage) 0.02 0.30  0.18 0.08 0.40 JC 
Observations after matching 147515 5398  1683 2548 1478 
Observations lost 3459 22 333  119 3 
(in percentage) 2.34 0.41 2.45  4.67 0.20 TE 
Observations after matching 144089 5392 13248  2431 1481 
Observations lost 286 104 12 74  5 
(in percentage) 0.19 1.92 0.09 4.39  0.34 PEP 
Observations after matching 147262 5310 13569 1612  1479 
Observations lost 685 9 1539 24 2  
(in percentage) 0.46 0.17 11.33 1.42 0.08  
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 
Observations after matching 146863 5405 12042 1662 2548  
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Table 5: Matching Quality 
   Treatment Group 
   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
   Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
MSAB   18.91 1.64 10.02 1.14 30.29 1.27 13.95 1.64 17.03 2.79 
Pseudo-R2   12.5 0.2 4.1 0.1 14.0 0.2 5.5 0.2 7.1 0.5 NP 
Log-Like  
P>chi   
5866.21 
(0.000) 
30.06 
(0.265) 
3817.92 
(0.000) 
52.84 
(0.001) 
2580.09 
(0.000) 
8.95 
(0.999) 
1432.46 
(0.000) 
15.79 
(0.921) 
1182.54 
(0.000) 
18.52 
(0.856) 
MSAB 18.91 5.34   25.44 4.63 23.75 2.48 18.41 2.97 13.41 2.78 
Pseudo-R2 12.5 1.3   31.0 1.5 29.1 0.5 16.9 0.7 23.8 0.7 DP 
Log-Like  
P>chi 
5866.21 
(0.000) 
5174.68 
(0.000)   
7036.10 
(0.000) 
549.71 
(0.000) 
3091.85 
(0.000) 
25.32 
(0.501) 
2384.7 
(0.000) 
48.11 
(0.004) 
2303.35 
(0.000) 
27.22 
(0.398) 
MSAB 10.02 1.34 25.44 3.06   36.44 2.71 18.93 3.33 26.04 3.38 
Pseudo-R2 4,1 0.1 31.0 0.6   18.2 0.7 16.1 0.6 13.3 0.8 JC 
Log-Like  
P>chi 
3817.92 
(0.000) 
460.32 
(0.000) 
7036.10 
(0.000) 
90.06 
(0.000)   
1419.8 
(0.000) 
31.8 
(0.200) 
1611.15 
(0.000) 
42.82 
(0.000) 
957.78 
(0.000) 
31.28 
(0.218) 
MSAB 30.29 6.24 23.75 5.02 36.44 8.43   30.63 4.41 27.23 2.22 
Pseudo-R2 14.0 2.6 18.2 1.4 29.1 4.4   25.5 1.4 21.1 0.3 TE 
Log-Like  
P>chi 
2580.09 
(0.000) 
10511.49 
(0.000) 
1419.8 
(0.000) 
208.14 
(0.000) 
3091.85 
(0.000) 
1619.22 
(0.000)   
1449.89 
(0.000) 
92.19 
(0.000) 
926.4 
(0.000) 
12.83 
(0.985) 
MSAB 13.95 2.42 18.41 3.81 18.93 3.78 30.63 4.67   13.24 3.74 
Pseudo-R2 5,51 0.4 16.1 0.9 16.9 0.8 25.5 1.4   9.5 0.8 PEP 
Log-Like  
P>chi 
1432.46 
(0.000) 
1715.4 
(0.000) 
1611.15 
(0.000) 
134.35 
(0.000) 
2384.7 
(0.000) 
301.17 
(0.000) 
1449.89 
(0.000) 
64.17 
(0.000)   
505.01 
(0.000) 
31.53 
(0.172) 
MSAB 17.03 6.94 13.41 3.75 26.04 8.55 27.23 6.01 13.24 4.73   
Pseudo-R2 7.1 1.8 13.3 1.0 23.8 2.3 21.1 2.2 9.5 1.4   
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
BT 
Log-Like  
P>chi 
1182.54 
(0.000) 
7282.18 
(0.000) 
957.78 
(0.000) 
152.92 
(0.000) 
2303.35 
(0.000) 
774.77 
(0.000) 
926.4 
(0.000) 
101.25 
(0.000) 
505.01 
(0.000) 
102.08 
(0.000)   
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Table 6: Average Registered Unemployment, Before and After Treatment 
Time Period   ÁTT
Mt ´
  Time Period   ÁTT
Mt
  
        
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  6.2% -1.1% 5.9% 7.6% 17.5% NP  -24.0% 14.2% -39.1% 21.5% -28.2%
DP -7.6%  0.7% 0.7% -1.4% 5.7% DP 28.4%  48.9% -18.6% 51.0% -3.7% 
JC -9.6% -10.9%  -6.2% -2.8% 9.9% JC -15.2% -39.5%  -51.6% 4.3% -43.8%
TE -11.2% -5.9% -8.4%  -4.6% 7.2% TE 44.9% 13.5% 67.4%  69.4% 13.8%
PEP -7.5% -1.6% 0.8% 2.2%  9.3% PEP -22.3% -49.8% -5.6% -65.8%  -52.7%
- 1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT -15.1% -10.9% -6.4% -9.0% -12.2%  
1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 26.6% 2.1% 43.1% -14.5% 54.9%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -1.5% -7.5% 0.2% -1.1% 12.8% NP  -12.7% 15.1% -7.0% 18.5% 2.4% 
DP -2.1%  2.5% 1.3% -4.4% 8.9% DP 17.2%  36.2% 0.8% 35.2% 14.0%
JC -2.6% 2.7%  7.7% -3.5% 13.7% JC -13.3% -20.3%  -16.5% 4.2% -12.2%
TE -16.5% -9.1% -13.1%  -15.1% 4.1% TE 11.7% -4.6% 33.3%  29.5% 5.7% 
PEP -0.8% 0.4% 6.8% -0.1%  11.0% PEP -20.0% -29.2% -3.7% -27.3%  -19.0%
- 2 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT -11.6% -8.7% -7.7% -3.9% -13.9%  
2 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 5.9% -11.1% 24.5% -7.5% 21.2%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -5.1% -39.4% -4.2% -12.3% -2.3% NP  -6.4% 10.5% -2.3% 12.9% 1.5% 
DP 3.2%  -21.3% -0.2% -6.6% 0.3% DP 12.8%  24.5% 0.8% 23.8% 5.2% 
JC 25.1% 14.6%  14.1% 13.1% 20.4% JC -6.8% -10.7%  -6.2% 3.8% -4.1% 
TE 3.5% -2.4% -33.3%  -6.7% -0.1% TE 3.7% -4.5% 22.1%  14.8% 0.2% 
PEP 11.6% 4.2% -10.2% 1.4%  3.9% PEP -12.5% -16.4% -3.1% -12.3%  -13.4%
- 3 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 2.1% -2.9% -25.9% 1.0% -10.2%  
3 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 7.1% -7.6% 14.9% -5.4% 16.0%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -5.7% -26.3% -6.7% -11.7% -5.1% NP  -4.6% 17.1% 1.7% 13.1% 7.0% 
DP 2.2%  -14.3% -2.0% -3.3% -1.1% DP 9.1%  25.4% 4.2% 21.5% 9.0% 
JC 17.0% 8.3%  6.2% 5.8% 9.9% JC -11.5% -8.6%  -4.1% 3.4% -2.6% 
TE 6.0% -0.3% -14.2%  -3.0% -1.5% TE 0.1% -5.3% 23.8%  12.1% 2.8% 
PEP 7.9% 2.3% -5.2% -3.0%  -1.2% PEP -17.0% -16.5% 2.0% -12.9%  -10.5%
- 4 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 5.6% -0.1% -13.5% 1.2% -3.8%  
4 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 0.8% -8.0% 15.0% -2.6% 9.0%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -1.2% -12.4% -4.1% -3.5% -3.6% NP  -6.6% -8.4% -8.0% -2.5% -6.6% 
DP -1.7%  -7.8% -2.0% 0.0% 0.7% DP 13.8%  5.6% 2.3% 9.8% 3.1% 
JC 6.2% 2.4%  1.7% 3.8% 3.3% JC 8.1% -2.9%  -0.6% 5.0% 0.3% 
TE 1.1% -2.5% -5.3%  -0.8% 2.1% TE 10.4% 0.4% 7.0%  6.5% 0.9% 
PEP 1.0% -1.3% -3.1% -4.2%  -3.2% PEP 1.4% -7.3% -5.2% -7.1%  -3.2% 
- 5 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 0.5% -2.7% -6.7% -1.3% -3.3%  
5 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 8.7% -1.7% 0.5% -3.9% 6.0%  
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Table 7: Results of the CDiD Estimator - ATT in Terms of Registered Unemployment  
Time Period   ÁTT
Mt
 - ÁTT
Mt ´
  (t’=t) Time Period   ÁTT
Mt
 - ÁTT
Mt ´
  (t’=-1) 
        
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -30.2% 15.4% -45.0% 13.9% -45.7% NP  -30.2% 15.4% -45.0% 13.9% -45.7%
DP 36.0%  48.1% -19.3% 52.4% -9.4% DP 36.0%  48.1% -19.3% 52.4% -9.4% 
JC -5.6% -28.5%  -45.4% 7.1% -53.8% JC -5.6% -28.5%  -45.4% 7.1% -53.8%
TE 56.1% 19.3% 75.8%  74.0% 6.6% TE 56.1% 19.3% 75.8%  74.0% 6.6% 
PEP -14.8% -48.1% -6.4% -68.0%  -62.0% PEP -14.8% -48.1% -6.4% -68.0%  -62.0%
 1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 41.8% 13.0% 49.6% -5.5% 67.2%  
1 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 41.8% 13.0% 49.6% -5.5% 67.2%   
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -11.2% 22.6% -7.2% 19.6% -10.4% NP  -18.9% 16.3% -12.9% 10.9% -15.1%
DP 19.2%  33.7% -0.5% 39.5% 5.1% DP 24.7%  35.5% 0.2% 36.6% 8.3% 
JC -10.7% -23.0%  -24.1% 7.6% -25.8% JC -3.6% -9.4%  -10.2% 6.9% -22.1%
TE 28.3% 4.5% 46.4%  44.5% 1.7% TE 22.9% 1.3% 41.7%  34.0% -1.5% 
PEP -19.2% -29.6% -10.5% -27.2%  -30.0% PEP -12.5% -27.6% -4.5% -29.5%  -28.3%
 2 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 17.6% -2.3% 32.2% -3.7% 35.1%  
2 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 21.1% -0.2% 31.0% 1.4% 33.4%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -1.3% 49.9% 1.9% 25.2% 3.8% NP  -12.7% 11.6% -8.2% 5.2% -16.0%
DP 9.5%  45.9% 1.1% 30.4% 4.9% DP 20.3%  23.8% 0.2% 25.2% -0.5% 
JC -32.0% -25.3%  -20.3% -9.3% -24.5% JC 2.8% 0.3%  0.0% 6.6% -14.0%
TE 0.2% -2.2% 55.5%  21.6% 0.3% TE 14.9% 1.3% 30.5%  19.4% -7.0% 
PEP -24.1% -20.6% 7.1% -13.7%  -17.2% PEP -5.0% -14.8% -3.9% -14.6%  -22.7%
 3 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 5.0% -4.8% 40.8% -6.4% 26.1%  
3 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 22.3% 3.3% 21.3% 3.6% 28.2%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  1.1% 43.4% 8.4% 24.8% 12.1% NP  -10.8% 18.2% -4.2% 5.4% -10.5%
DP 7.0%  39.7% 6.2% 24.8% 10.0% DP 16.7%  24.7% 3.5% 22.9% 3.3% 
JC -28.5% -16.9%  -10.3% -2.4% -12.5% JC -1.8% 2.3%  2.1% 6.2% -12.6%
TE -5.9% -5.0% 38.0%  15.0% 4.3% TE 11.3% 0.6% 32.2%  16.6% -4.5% 
PEP -24.9% -18.8% 7.1% -9.9%  -9.3% PEP -9.5% -14.9% 1.2% -15.1%  -19.8%
 4 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT -4.8% -7.9% 28.4% -3.8% 12.8%  
4 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 15.9% 2.8% 21.4% 6.4% 21.3%  
                  
  Treatment Group   Treatment Group 
  NP DP JC TE PEP BT   NP DP JC TE PEP BT 
NP  -5.4% 3.9% -3.9% 0.9% -3.0% NP  -12.9% -7.3% -13.9% -10.2% -24.1%
DP 15.5%  13.5% 4.3% 9.8% 2.4% DP 21.3%  4.9% 1.6% 11.2% -2.6% 
JC 1.9% -5.3%  -2.3% 1.2% -3.0% JC 17.7% 8.0%  5.6% 7.8% -9.6% 
TE 9.3% 2.8% 12.3%  7.3% -1.2% TE 21.6% 6.2% 15.4%  11.0% -6.3% 
PEP 0.5% -6.1% -2.1% -2.9%  0.1% PEP 8.9% -5.7% -5.9% -9.3%  -12.5%
 5 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 8.3% 1.0% 7.2% -2.5% 9.3%  
5 
Co
m
pa
ris
on
 G
ro
up
 
BT 23.9% 9.2% 6.9% 5.1% 18.3%  
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Figure 2: ATT Compared to the NP Treatment State 
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Figure 3: ATT Compared to the DP Treatment State  
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Figure 4: ATT Compared to the JC Treatment State 
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Figure 5: ATT Compared to the TE Treatment State  
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Figure 6: ATT Compared to the BT Treatment State  
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Figure 7: ATT Compared to the PEP Treatment State  
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